Virtuous aging and existential vulnerability

Abstract

In its efforts to overcome problematic views that associate aging with inevitable decline, contemporary gerontology shows a tendency to focus predominantly on age-related vulnerabilities that science may try to remedy and control. However, gerontology should also offer languages to address vulnerabilities that cannot be remedied because they intrinsically belong to the human condition. After all, these are increasingly radically encountered in later life and should therefore be reflected upon in the study of aging. Humanistic gerontology seems to be the most promising field to look for languages capable of contemplating such existential vulnerabilities. The potential contribution of philosophy in this field remains underdeveloped so far, however. This article therefore aims to introduce insights from the philosophical tradition to (humanistic) gerontology. More specifically, it focuses on the tradition of virtue ethics, arguing that virtue is a particularly relevant notion to explore in dealing with existential vulnerability in later life. The notion of virtue is clarified by discussing a selection of philosophical perspectives on this topic, by Aristotle, MacIntyre and Swanton. Next a brief overview will be given of some of the ways the notion of virtue has found its way into gerontological discourse so far. The article ends with an analysis of the merits of virtue-ethical discourse for the study of aging and later life, and pleads for more inclusion of philosophical ideas such as virtue in gerontology, as these can enrich our conceptual frameworks and help us relate to deep existential questions regarding the experience of aging.