Virtue

Abstract

Abstract Moral and political philosophers have been interested in the concept of virtue since the beginning of recorded thought. While some of these discussions frequently take on a highly abstract form and deal with complex matters of epistemology and psychology, one of the initial guiding inspirations for the inquiry into virtue was not to know what virtue is, but to become good. In accordance with this practical consideration and its focus on the formation of good character, ethics and the concern for virtue were understood as a branch of political science whose proper end was to make good citizens, capable of noble actions. Despite the more recent tendency to characterize these kinds of commitments as entailing a form of “moral perfectionism” that might otherwise strain credulity, Aristotle freely owned that “it is no easy task to be good.” From Confucius, Plato, and Aristotle, to Aquinas, Hume, and Kant, moral and political philosophers have not only inquired into the nature, purpose, and end of virtue, but have also provided complex and diverse accounts of a range of more specific virtues (and vices). For their part, political theorists have also shown an acute interest in asking whether specific ethical virtues (or what are perceived to be good ethical qualities) remain so within the unique context of political deliberation, public judgment, and collective action and whether certain qualities that might be labeled vices in personal moral life are capable of serving as necessary virtues in public‐political life.