Virtue, self-mastery, and the autocracy of practical reason

Abstract

Kant’s theory of virtue has received considerably less attention than the moral theory set out in his most widely read ethical texts, theGroundwork of the MetaphysicsofMoralsandtheCritiqueofPracticalReason.Moreover,this account of virtue has not always been well understood. In light of the fact that Kant characterizes virtue in terms of strength of will over feelings and inclinations that conflict with duty, commentators have suggested that Kant’s account of virtue is impoverished, insofar as it appears to be a recipe for nothing more than continence. 1 Part of the problem in uncovering a comprehensive picture of Kant’s full account of moral character lies with Kant, for his remarks about virtue in his later and less well-known writings arescatteredandnotalwayssystematicallypresented.AlthoughtheDoctrine of Virtue contains a sustained treatment of virtue and our various ethical obligations (duties of virtue), that work requires careful interpretation and reconstruction. Fortunately, Kant’s Lectures on Ethics, now easily accessible in English translation, provide an additional valuable resource for readers interested in understanding a more complete picture of Kant’s conception of virtue, its importance in his overall ethics, and its relation to other foundational concepts in his moral theory. This essay analyzes four central theses concerning the nature of virtue that Kant himself emphasizes in the Lectures on Ethics. Although these four themes do not provide an exhaustive account of Kant’s theory of virtue, together they lay a solid foundation for any systematic interpretation of Kant’s considered views on moral character. 1 This distinction between full virtue and mere continence, which is crucial for Aristotle’s moral psychology, is understood to be a distinguishing feature of classical virtue ethics more generally. Contemporary theorists who have questioned whether Kant has the resources to distinguish between the person who merely acts rightly and the person who is wholehearted in what she does include Julia Annas, Talbot Brewer, David Brink, Rosalind Hursthouse, and Martha Nussbaum. See Annas 1993, 53 and 2006, 517; Brewer 2002; Brink 1999, 580 and 2000, 431; Hursthouse 1999, 104; and Nussbaum 2001, 172. I explore this theme at length in Baxley 2010.