Virtue Ethics, Kantian Ethics, and the “One Thought Too Many” Objection

Abstract

Claims by proponents of virtue ethics that virtue “ethics is a rival to deontological and utilitarian approaches, as interestingly and challengingly different from either as they are from each other,” have met with some skepticism. Kantians (and others) have wondered whether virtue ethics and Kantian ethics are as deeply opposed as some virtue ethicists claim, and if not, whether it might be possible to have a Kantian virtue ethics. Such reflections were helpful in advancing the debate at a time when virtue ethicists did not provide a very clear picture of just what virtue ethics was, and often presented it primarily in terms of its opposition to Kantian ethics and sometimes also to utilitarianism (or, more broadly, consequentialism). The challenges spurred virtue ethicists on to clarify and refine their conception of virtue ethics. In addition, the bar was raised for discussions of Kantian ethics, for as Kantians (myself among them) pointed out various ways in which Kantian ethics seemed to be compatible with virtue ethics (seemed, because we couldn’t tell