Abstract
AbstractThe Gettier dilemma facing reductive analyses of knowledge has not been properly appreciated by virtue epistemologists or even virtue epistemology’s most vocal critics. This paper starts by considering how recent critics of virtue epistemology understand the Gettier problem facing virtue‐theoretic accounts of knowledge. The paper highlights how the dilemma facing virtue‐theoretic analyses of knowledge is more general than these critics seem to suggest. It then elucidates the worry that the threat facing virtue epistemology is really a dilemma between Gettier counterexamples and radical skepticism. Finally, the paper considers how some recent virtue epistemologists have tried to viably defuse the Gettier problem. It shows (i) just how the critiques it elucidates have (mis)shaped the dialectic between virtue epistemology and what is required in solving Gettier counterexamples and (ii) how this has led to virtue epistemologists underestimating the widespread insidiousness of Gettier counterexamples.
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