Abstract
AbstractOne response to the challenge of Egoism is to deny that there is a distinction between reasons of self-interest and moral reasons. Aristotle, for instance, claimed that the good life, the life of eudaimonia, was also a life of virtue. A tradition of virtue ethics following Aristotle, recently exemplified by Foot and Hursthouse, agrees. This chapter sets out the distinctive claims of virtue ethics, which depends on a conception of the good life that is ‘moralized’, and of a parallel theory – virtue Egoism – which is based on an ‘unmoralized’ account of self-interest.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
