Violent orders and coup-proofing: A new typology of wars in Africa

Abstract

ABSTRACT Conflicts on the African continent present a paradox: the number of conflicts and casualties are increasing while at the same time becoming more peripheral and less threatening to governments. This article argues that the rise of a new kind of conflict helps explain this trend: violent political orders in which warfare is used by governments as a means of doling out patronage and managing dissent rather than defeating opponents on the battlefield. This logic of governance emerges as regimes weaken their own military as a form of coup-proofing; and due to the rampant fragmentation and marginalisation of insurgent groups, which lack the ability to topple governments. After detailed broad conflict trends on the continent, the article uses conflicts in Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of the Congo as examples of this logic, with Mali offered as a partial, theory-building exception. Grappling with this reality will require peacemakers to shift focus from the short-term imperatives of reaching peace deals to the broader challenge of reforming the logic of governance at the heart of the state.