Abstract
Abstract There are some properties, like being bald, for which it is vague where the boundary between the things that have it and the things that do not lies. A number of arguments threaten to show that such properties can still be associated with determinate and knowable boundaries: not between the things that have it and those that don’t, but between the things such that it is borderline at some order whether they have it and the things for which it is not. I argue that these arguments, if successful, turn on a contentious principle in the logic of determinacy: Brouwer’s Principle, that every truth is determinately not determinately false. Other paradoxes which do not appear to turn on this principle often tacitly make assumptions about assertion, knowledge and higher-order vagueness. In this paper I’ll show how one can avoid sharp higher-order boundaries by rejecting these assumptions.
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