Vietnam and the Sino-Soviet Rivalry

Abstract

D URING the 1960s, the bitterness of the Sino-Soviet feud and the unlikelihood of early reconciliation constituted an important factor in the US decision to intervene militarily in Vietnam. The war, in turn, led to a fierce internecine quarrel in the Communist world as to whether the USSR or China was North Vietnam's most faithful ally. At the same time, Soviet aid to Hanoi gave Moscow an opening into Southeast Asia -an area where its influence had hitherto been relatively weak, and which had been accorded a fairly low priority in Soviet foreign policy. North Vietnam's victory in 1975, made possible primarily by Soviet military assistance, and the emergence of a reunified Vietnam as a Sovietbacked power with regional pretensions, confronted China with hostile neighbors on two sides. Moreover, Moscow's military-and especially naval-buildup in Southeast Asia made the Soviet Union an ominous presence in a region that China had traditionally regarded as its own sphere of influence. Southeast Asia is but one focus-although a very important oneof the intense global competition between Moscow and Peking. The Soviet strategic advance into many areas of the Third World-an advance aimed both at isolating the United States and containing China -has triggered a Chinese diplomatic offensive that can be viewed as countercontainment of the USSR. Among the most significant aspects of this offensive have been Chinese aid to the guerrilla movements (UNITA and FNLA) opposing the pro-Soviet MPLA regime in Angola; the recent establishment of diplomatic ties with Oman, the site of a simmering insurrection fueled by pro-Soviet South Yemen; Foreign Minister Huang Hua's June 1978 visit to Zaire (accompanied by offers of military aid) in the wake of a Soviet-backed and Angolabased invasion of Zaire's Shaba Province; Huang's trip to Turkey and the subsequent establishment of diplomatic relations; the recent visit of