Victorian Warfare, 1837–1902

Abstract

Following the victory over Napoleon at Waterloo in 1815, British global supremacy went effectively unchallenged for a century. Between 1815 and 1914, Great Britain was engaged in only one conflict against a European power, the Crimean War against Russia. But continued overseas expansion—often driven by local agents against the wishes of government in London—brought increasing security commitments, not least in India and Africa. The potential for rebellion or unrest among Indigenous populations was always present. In the last quarter of the 19th century alone, the British Empire increased by 4.7 million square miles and nearly 90 million inhabitants. Acquiring, pacifying, and holding such an empire inevitably involved military action. Between 1837 and 1854 there were seventeen major colonial campaigns. Between 1872 and 1899, the British army fought another thirty-five major campaigns and a number of minor ones: there were twenty-seven separate expeditions on the North West Frontier of India alone between 1868 and 1908. The army suffered from being perceived as far less important than the Royal Navy since Britain was first and foremost a global maritime power. The army’s problem, therefore, was to meet its rapidly expanding commitments of home and imperial defense through a system of voluntary enlistment, which correlated closely with unemployment and distanced the army from wider society. No appetite for continental-style conscription existed and the soldier was generally despised, albeit that imperial expansion led to an increasing degree of militarism within society and military exploits became widely celebrated in popular culture. The impact of colonial conflicts upon popular culture in Britain, however, remains a matter of debate, as does the impact upon Indigenous peoples. Colonial campaigning posed particular problems of terrain and climate. These had to be overcome by an army not only frequently starved of resources, but also struggling with issues of professionalism that pitted traditional elements within the officer corps against those anxious to reform and modernize the army. Military reform was much discussed but, even when implemented, it invariably reflected political and, especially, financial constraints that militated against real efficiency. The army could not have met the challenges of “small wars” without soldiers harnessing advances in medicine, weaponry, and communications. Undeniably, however, such campaigns did not prepare the army for the kind of mass industrialized warfare that was to mark the 20th century, the South African War (1899–1902) being something of a precursor of the future.