Abstract
This paper considers a general package auction problem and a class of payment rules we refer to as standard. In a “standard” pricing rule, each winner pays at least his “minimum required value” to win. The minimum required value coincides with the payment in the Vickrey auction, and standard auctions include the Vickrey auction and core-selecting auctions by Day and Milgrom (2008, Int. J. Game Theory). We show that any payoff allocation in the bidder-optimal core is achieved by a full-information Nash equilibrium in any standard auction.
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