Veto Bargaining and Coalition Formation: A Theory of Presidential Policymaking with Application to Venezuela

Abstract

This paper reports a work in progress. We extend a simple, complete-information model of executive-legislative bargaining over policy devised for the U.S. to fit the case of Venezuela. We first deal with two major differences between the two systems: Venezuelan presidents have a weaker veto than their U.S. counterparts, and Venezuelan presidents can initiate bills. Two main predictions follow from the model’s assumptions: no veto should ever occur, and no executive-sponsored bill should ever be defeated; the logic behind both hypotheses is anticipation. The evidence from Venezuela (1959-1995) falsifies both predictions, suggesting that some of the model’s assumptions are too restrictive. We make tentative suggestions of what a more complete model should look like. We then address a third difference between the presidential systems of Venezuela and the U.S.: Venezuelan presidents often make post-election coalitions to improve their support in the assembly. We find strong evidence of one effect of this legislative strategy: coalition cabinets have better support for their programs in the legislature.