Abstract
We study information disclosure in a vertically differentiated duopoly with unaware consumers. Sellers have private information about the adverse effect of their products, while consumers are unaware of existence of such adverse effect unless they are informed by the sellers. We show that information remains hidden only if information disclosure reduces the size of the market. In such a case, whether information is disclosed depends on the intensity of competition, the difference of the adverse effect between the two sellers, and the timing at which pricing and information disclosure decisions are made.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
