Vertical (Restrictive) Agreements: Eff ectivity Despite the Risk

Abstract

The aim of this Paper is recognition of different levels of anticompetitive risk of a vertical agreement and resultant decission about a legal consequence, from per se prohibition to qualification of a deal as a restrictive one, along with stressing the significance of application of a de minimis rule. Here in it is a three-segment model, which, on the basis of quantitative-qulitative criteria, recognizes different bases for realization of effectivity of a vertical agreements in contrast of a risk. It is to come to a conclusion that an anticompetitive risk by a vertical agreements in a case of non-existence of dominant market possition of participants is supposed to be low one, where it would be recommendable further adoptation of solutions of protection of competition in a domestic law, and the first step in that direction could be widening of an area of application of vertical agreements of a smaller significance by lifting up a quantative level of a distinctive participants relevant market shares.