Vertical Distribution of Fiscal Revenue and Its Effect on Balancing Economic Growth

Abstract

不断扩大的地区间差异困扰着中国发展, 并成为社会稳定的重要隐患。为了缓解 地区间差距可能引发的各种矛盾 ,中国政府在1994年分税体制改革之后确立了具有集 权倾向的财政收入垂直分配关系。通过财政资金的大规模双向流动, 这种财政收入垂 直分配关系促进了财政资金的跨区域配置和财政能力的地区间均等。但作为分权体制 的重要制度安排, 其在均衡地区间经济增长方面的作用却很有限, 主要表现为大规模 收入集中对经济发达地区的增长抑制。财政收入垂直分配关系的这些影响与地方财政 非税收入依赖程度以及中央专项补助水平存在明显交互作用, 前者显著弱化了财政收 入过度集中的不利增长效应, 后者却显著弱化了中央补助的增长激励。 关键词: 财政收入 集权倾向 均衡增长 Widening interregional disparity is an obstacle to China’s development and a serious latent threat to social stability. To alleviate conflicts that may arise from this disparity, the Chinese government established centrally-oriented vertical distribution of fiscal revenue following the 1994 tax-sharing reform. Through massive two-way funding flows, this vertical distribution has promoted the allocation of financial resources and equalization of fiscal capacity across regions. However, as an important institutional arrangement in decentralization, it has played a limited role in balancing interregional economic growth. This is mainly evident in the growth constraint on economically developed regions under large-scale revenue centralization. The effect of the vertical distribution of fiscal revenue clearly interacts with local reliance on non-tax revenue and the level of earmarked grant from the central government, with the former significantly weakening the anti-growth effect of excessive centralization of fiscal revenue and the latter markedly reducing the growth incentive of central government subsidies.