Abstract
After an introduction to Chicago School antitrust analysis, this paper provides an overview of the main insights that economic theory has provided in regard to vertical agreements. Following a theoretical discussion of both the benign and anticompetitive motivations for vertical coordination and a survey of the empirical literature, the paper concludes that while a general per se prohibition on price restraints is unlikely to be appropriate, there is reason to have a policy that is more restrictive on price restraints than nonprice restraints.
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