Abstract
We study the automated verification of pointer safety for heap-manipulating imperative programs with unknown procedure calls. Given a Hoare-style partial correctness specification S = { Pre } C { Post } in separation logic, where the program C contains calls to some unknown procedure U , we infer a specification S U for the unknown procedure U from the calling contexts. We show that the problem of verifying the program C against the specification S can be safely reduced to the problem of proving that the procedure U (once its code is available) meets the derived specification S U . The expected specification S U for the unknown procedure U is automatically calculated using an abduction-based shape analysis. We have also implemented a prototype system to validate the viability of our approach. Preliminary results show that the specifications derived by our tool fully capture the behaviors of the unknown code in many cases.
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