Abstract
Future nuclear arms-control agreements may place numerical limits on items that are difficult to monitor with national technical means, even when complemented with onsite inspections. Such items could include small objects and mobile assets, such as non-deployed nuclear warheads and mobile missile launchers. Typically, this verification task can be addressed with unique identifiers, but standard tagging techniques may be unacceptable in this case due to host concerns about safety and intrusiveness. First proposed in the late 1980s and partially developed by Sandia National Laboratories in the early 1990s, the “Proximity Tag” or “Buddy Tag” concept seeks to overcome these concerns by separating the tag from the treaty accountable item itself. A buddy tag has two key elements: a tamper-indicating enclosure and a motion-detection system designed to detect illicit movements in a stand-down period. As part of this project, we have built a buddy-tag prototype for demonstration and evaluation purposes. This paper reviews the design choices and functionalities of the tag's motion-detection subsystem. We pursue a modular approach for the tag's hardware, built around an Arduino-class microcontroller and a non-export-controlled low-noise accelerometer, and use open-source algorithms for the motion-detection software. We discuss the results of an extensive experimental campaign involving both indoor and outdoor measurements assessing the performance of the tag under real-world environmental conditions.
Highlights
F OR almost fifty years, the United States and Russia have successfully pursued nuclear arms control to manage the risks associated with their nuclear arsenals
The world is likely to enter a period without bilateral nuclear arms control and, when it emerges, may have to face a number of new challenges, including some important ones related to verification of limits on nuclear stockpiles
There are currently no established methods for an inspecting party to independently confirm a numerical limit on treaty limited items if the items themselves or their locations are highly sensitive in nature
Summary
F OR almost fifty years, the United States and Russia have successfully pursued nuclear arms control to manage the risks associated with their nuclear arsenals. The world is likely to enter a period without bilateral nuclear arms control and, when it emerges, may have to face a number of new challenges, including some important ones related to verification of limits on nuclear stockpiles While both INF and START relied extensively on onsite inspections [1], [2], verification of future agreements may benefit from (or require) less intrusive types of inspections. The exact locations of mobile missile launchers (or non-deployed nuclear warheads) are generally considered highly sensitive information, which would further complicate access to these for verification purposes To address this dilemma, in this article, we revisit the so-called “proximity tag” or “buddy tag” concept first considered in the late 1980s [7] and further explored at Sandia National Laboratories in the early 1990s as an option to confirm numerical limits on missile systems (Figure 2). The choice of micro-electro-mechanical systems (MEMS) accelerometers allows for a much smaller prototype with reduced power consumption. We offer new and reproducible results for the buddy-tag prototype and examine the viability and potential value of the concept for verifying future arms-control agreements
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