Abstract
Abstract On one view, definitional disputes are primarily about how we should use words. TI reject this view is rejected. PI give precise accounts are given of two claims associated with this view: that definitional disputes are merely verbal disputes, and that definitional disputes are matters of metalinguistic negotiation. The idea that definitional disputes are merely verbal falsely predicts that purely practical considerations bear on the issues; this is calledI call this the Wrong Kinds of Reason Argument. The idea that definitional disputes are metalinguistic negotiations cannot make sense of many of the kinds of evidence and arguments that do bear on the issues; I call this is called the Argument Argument.
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