Abstract

Abstract Ancien régime venality of office has been axiomatically associated with inefficiency and corruption. In the case of mid-ranking provincial royal forestry officers, such behaviour was blamed on the limited promotion opportunities and poor financial rewards of their office. This article argues that active engagement with municipal politics was an additional, and more effective, compensation strategy for these office-holders because they could capitalize on the opportunities provided by the introduction of municipal venality in 1692. While financially unrewarding, civic participation enhanced their local status and prestige. It also contributed to the concentration of municipal power into few privileged hands, which over time severely undermined more participative forms of local governance. Ultimately, the failure of Colbert’s vision of forestry as an efficient public service was not due to the venal nature of the forestry office per se, but to office-holders sacrificing dedication to the king’s service for enhanced municipal prominence.

Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call