Veiled Threats: How Do Identity Threats Shape Muslims' Support for Terrorism?

Abstract

In recent decades, Islamic-inspired terrorism has worsened intergroup tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims in western democratic countries, including Australia. Muslims and Islam are often linked with terrorism, and the resulting tension between Muslims and non-Muslims has fostered an “us” versus “them” mentality (Blackwood et al., 2013b). Some research suggests that the alienation Muslims feel as a result of the stigma they have faced in recent years can push some Muslims towards radicalisation (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010; Dugan & Distler, 2016). In my dissertation, I propose that the disproportionate scrutiny that Muslims face in western democratic countries may lead some Muslims to support terrorism. Drawing on Social Identity Theory (SIT), my dissertation centres on the proposition that Muslims’ support for terrorism may manifest when some Muslims experience identity threats from non-Muslims. I propose that a feedback loop exists whereby non-Muslims’ attitudes and actions towards Muslims, as well as ingroup/ out-group tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims, may lead some Muslims in Australia to experience identity threats. I propose that non-Muslims might come to hold punitive views towards Muslims because they perceive Muslims to be a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat and that their national identity as Australians can influence this association. I also suggest that Muslims can come to perceive that their identities are threatened by (1) feeling stigmatised and (2) believing that others are punitive towards Muslims (conceptualised in my dissertation as meta-punitiveness). I further argue that the strength of a Muslim’s national and religious identity might influence how susceptible some Muslims are to these identity threats. Existing studies typically focus on how support for terrorism may arise amongst Muslims living in Muslim-majority countries. Yet, few studies consider how Muslims come to support terrorism when they constitute a minority group in a western country. My research takes place in Australia. My dissertation focuses on both Muslims and non-Muslims living in Australia to examine the ingroup/out-group tensions between the two groups. Doing so will result in a more thorough understanding of how and why some Muslims might come to support terrorism. My dissertation presents three interrelated studies. Together, these three studies demonstrate how the attitudes and behaviours of one group (i.e., non-Muslims) have the potential to impact the attitudes and behaviours of another group (i.e., Muslims) and vice versa. Studies 1 and 2 utilise survey data I collected from 1,193 non-Muslim Australians. In the Attitudes to Punishment Survey, I presented participants with information depicting a terrorist event whereby the motivation forthe attack was described as being Islamic-inspired or right-wing-inspired. Study 1 explores if non-Muslims hold more punitive attitudes towards the perpetrator motivated by Islamic-inspired terrorism relative to the perpetrator motivated by right-wing-inspired terrorism. It also explores the extent to which non-Muslims see Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat and believe that Muslims support terrorism. Study 2 draws on SIT to understand how non-Muslims’ attitudes towards Muslims are associated with their support for punitive counter-terrorism policies. Study 2 tests if non-Muslims’ Australian national identity is related to their perceptions of Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat and their support for punitive counter-terrorism policies. Study 3 draws on secondary survey data from 398 Muslim Australians collected in the Sydney Immigrant Survey (SIS). Study 3 investigates if Muslims’ experiences of identity threat (i.e., feeling stigmatised and feeling non-Muslims are punitive towards Muslims) are associated with their support for terrorism. Moreover, Study 3 considers whether or not identity (i.e., both their Australian national identity and their religious identity) plays a role in mitigating or exacerbating the association between identity threats on Muslims’ support for terrorism. Together, the findings from Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate a positive association between perceiving Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat, holding a strong national identity, and supporting punitive counter-terrorism policies. In Study 1, I find that non-Muslim Australian participants on average: (a) held more punitive views of counter-terrorism policies, (b) viewed Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat, and (c) believed that Muslims support terrorism if they received a vignette describing a suspect inspired by Islamic-inspired compared to right-wing-inspired motives. In Study 2 I find that non-Muslims’ Australian national identity was positively associated with their (a) perceptions of Muslims as a realistic, symbolic and terroristic threat, and (b) support for punitive counterterrorism policies. Specifically, those non-Muslims who held a stronger national identity perceived Muslims as a greater threat and were more supportive of punitive counter-terrorism policies. In Study 3, I turned my attention to the perspectives and experiences of the Muslim sample. I tested if non-Muslims’ perceptions of threat towards Muslims and their support for punitive counter-terrorism policies (that often target Muslims more than other groups) translated to experiencing a stronger identity threat amongst my Muslim sample. I considered if Muslims’ feelings that others stigmatised them (e.g., viewed them as a suspect) and perceptions that others were punitive towards Muslims because of their race, ethnicity or religion (i.e., meta-punitiveness) would be associated with Muslims’ heightened support for terrorism. I found that experiencing one type of identity threat (i.e., meta-punitiveness) was associated with Muslims’ increased support for terrorism. I also found that holding a strong national identity (i.e., as an Australian) had a protective role in reducing Muslims’ support for terrorism. In sum, I find support for a possible feedback loop, whereby the attitudes and behaviours of non-Muslims may shape an atmosphere instrumental to increasing Muslims’ support for terrorism via their felt identity threats. I argue that support for punitive counter-terrorism policies by non-Muslims may perpetuate the identity threats experienced by Muslims. I conclude that this reinforces the need to address broader public attitudes towards Muslims to prevent the narrative associating Muslims with terrorism. I suggest it is also essential to create an environment conducive to building a national identity amongst Muslim residents. Ensuring that Muslims feel socially included in society and feel a strong affiliation with the nation they live in is vital as other research suggests that people will act in the best interests of groups they feel a secure attachment to (Stephan et al., 2009; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Preventing terrorism necessitates a whole-of-community response and requires that counter-terrorism initiatives do not alienate or disproportionately affect Muslim communities. Examining support for terrorism through Muslim and non-Muslim perceptions will help to reframe the divisive “us” versus “them” discourse into a more collective “we.”