Veiled Politics

Abstract

In her paper, Undressing Difference: Hijab in the West, Anita Allen claims that the French ban on wearing the hijab in public schools was a misguided attempt toward religious neutrality.1 For Allen, a liberal society's commitment to a secular, inclusive society can be far better expressed in a more substantive way, for instance, by creating opportunities for jobs, adequate housing, and good education for the minority youth than by legislating against symbols of difference.2 She commends the United States, where she believes such a ban on the hijab in the classroom would be unconstitutional, though she admits that the United States still has to go some length in being a viable multicultural democracy. Allen concludes, following the lead of Joan Wallach Scott's well-known book, The Politics of the Veil, that a liberal society committed to pluralism should pursue the goal of nation-sharing.3 Allen doesn't spell out what such a task would entail, but she agrees with Scott that some of the standard ideas of inclusive politics such as integration, tolerance, and multiculturalism are problematic in finding ways of addressing difference.In this article I seek to provide some philosophical details and substance to the debate surrounding the politics of difference and the liberal project of inclusion in a pluralistic democracy. The hijab controversy needs to be placed within this broader discourse to be more meaningful. As economic globalization has built bridges through cultural differences, it has had problems in demarcating appropriate boundaries. The egalitarian commitment to justice and human rights and the democratic ideal of legitimacy through self-rule and autonomy are often manifested in the tension between individual rights and group rights. Because both rights are in a continual state of flux and readjustment due to the shifting nature of the forces of globalization, to work out the right balance in theory is not easy. Thus, though the issues of multiculturalism and democratic accommodation are on the forefront of the liberal consciousness, the problem of moral evaluations of cultural practices in a liberal democracy offers no easy resolution. Norms of cultural well-being may not always coincide with those of individual autonomy, so a liberal society must proceed with caution in promoting a one-dimensional directive that may clash with claims of culture. As Allen points out in her article cited above, the idea of nationality in a multicultural society is a fluid concept that requires a nuanced approach, not a strict mandate of uniformity. Such a move can be viewed as a sign of unreasonable intolerance, thus being contrary to the tenets of liberalism itself. Accordingly, the multiculturalist challenge to the liberal ideal of a secular, inclusive society that professes to be egalitarian is a powerful reminder, also echoed by liberal critics such as Allen and Scott, that a viable Uberai theory must adequately articulate its professed claims of tolerance, pluraUsm, and neutrality. Liberal society's commitment to equality entails democratic pluraUsm, which requires mainstream equality of ilUberal groups and cultures. But this requires a complex balancing of several competing claims on several fronts, which seems to pose a dilemma for liberalism. Critics point out that multicultural accommodation in a pluralistic society may require giving minority cultures greater protection and more autonomy, especially in areas where their religious and cultural commitments related to their identity may seem to be at stake, regardless of whether or not those commitments are compatible with liberal egalitarian values. In fact, liberal theorists themselves point out, like Allen and Scott above, that an impartial liberal theory is not incompatible with distinct principles of affirmative equality with regard to illiberal groups - within reason, of course. For them, granting school girls the right to wear the hijab would presumably fall within this threshold of reason. …