Abstract

AbstractIn 2005, Peyravian-Jeffries proposed secure password-based protocols for remote user authentication, password change, and session key establishment over insecure networks. These protocols, however, are still susceptible to a stolen-verifier attack. Accordingly, the current paper demonstrates the vulnerability of their protocols to a stolen-verifier attack and then, a simple solution to resolve such a problem is presented. In contrast to these protocols, the proposed solution can resist the stolen-verifier attack.KeywordsCryptographyHash functionNetwork securityPassword authenticationDiffie-HellmanStolen-verifier attack

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