Abstract
The dispositional nature of aesthetic properties is taken by some to be a problem for aesthetic property realism. Nick Zangwill argues that because aesthetic properties supervene on sensory properties such as color, they must be secondary qualities, and his response-dependence account of secondary qualities leads him to aesthetic nonrealism about sensory properties and then aesthetic properties. I find that Zangwill's treatment of sensory property dispositions falls prey to a confusion of the dispositions and their manifestations, and his argument moves too quickly from conceptual to ontological response-dependence. The possibility of a realist dispositional account of sensory and aesthetic properties remains open.
Highlights
Zangwill’s case for nonrealism about sensory properties begins with the claim that they are secondary qualities, a claim with which I would agree provided that what he has in mind is something akin to Locke’s primary/secondary quality distinction
Locke’s primary qualities are much like the categorical properties in the categorical/ dispositional distinction used in the powers and dispositions literature; Locke’s secondary and tertiary qualities together correspond roughly to the dispositional properties.iv The categorical/ dispositional distinction highlights the difference between the static, structural features of objects—categorical properties—and their causal powers, directed at certain event types wherein they manifest themselves—dispositional properties
Zangwill recognizes that the response-dependence question is a metaphysical one, rather than a semantic or conceptual one,x but I shall argue that his case for sensory property response-dependence and nonrealism only goes so far as to show that sensory properties are conceptually response-dependent
Summary
Standing in relation to human responses does not necessitate mind-dependence. When I pick up a box of books, I experience its mass as gravitational pull; the resulting sensation of weightiness is a human response, yet mass is not a mind-dependent property. An entity x is ontologically dependent on another entity y if the existence of y is necessary for the existence of x In this sense, one might say that the hole in the center of a doughnut depends on the existence of the doughnut, and Caesar’s assassination depends on the existence of Caesar.viii Zangwill’s claim is that because sensory properties depend on human responses, they are not part of the objective world, a world left over when we subtract humans. One might say that the hole in the center of a doughnut depends on the existence of the doughnut, and Caesar’s assassination depends on the existence of Caesar.viii Zangwill’s claim is that because sensory properties depend on human responses, they are not part of the objective world, a world left over when we subtract humans This is a claim about the nature and existence of sensory properties, and so the dependence in question needs to be ontological. Zangwill recognizes that the response-dependence question is a metaphysical one, rather than a semantic or conceptual one,x but I shall argue that his case for sensory property response-dependence and nonrealism only goes so far as to show that sensory properties are conceptually response-dependent
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