Varieties of Propositional Ignorance

Abstract

Abstract This chapter considers in more detail six varieties of propositional ignorance: disbelieving, suspending, undecided, unconsidered, deep, and complete ignorance. It was argued in the previous chapters that there are at least two rival views to the New View that the author has defended, namely, the Standard View, on which ignorance is lack of knowledge, and Duncan Pritchard’s Normative View, on which ignorance is the lack of true belief that issues from the violation of a duty to inquire. This means that—depending on which view on ignorance one embraces—one could distinguish at least two more varieties of ignorance, namely, true belief that falls short of knowledge and true belief from duty violation. This chapter explores each of these alleged varieties of ignorance. Subsequently, it spells out the difference between first- and second-order ignorance. Finally, it shows how distinguishing these varieties of ignorance can be helpful in developing a philosophical thesis or argument by applying it to John Rawls’s well-known “veil of ignorance” argument.