Abstract

One more point to be made about the analytic/synthetic distinction and its place in conceptual role theories in general will lead the way to distinguishing between three different views of conceptual role and SCRT. One traditional objection to Conceptual Role Theory, which has already been discussed, is that equating meaning with inferential role (or conceptual role) implies that systems which differ in their beliefs (or other attitudes) will be meaning incomparable. If the systems don’t share all of their beliefs, they don’t share any.114 One attempted solution to this problem of meaning incomparability would be to invoke the analytic/synthetic distinction, and stipulate that only the analytic connections determine meaning. SCRT’s radical consequences of meaning incomparability and elimination of error and misrepresentation would be avoided if meaning were defined only by some liaisons, perhaps the analytic ones, and not every liaison in the system. A simple change in synthetic beliefs won’t affect the meanings, and meanings between systems which agree on all the analytic connections can have common meanings. However, we have good reasons for rejecting the traditional analytic/synthetic distinction, and in this case in particular, it seems that the notion of analyticity required presupposes the notion of two expressions or representations having comparable meaning. Yet there is a kind of pseudo-analytic/synthetic distinction which might do the job in a non-circular way and would not be of the objectionable kind which was a cornerstone of Positivism.

Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call