Varieties of Intentionalism

Abstract

In Imagination and Convention: Distinguishing Grammar and Inference in Language, Ernie Lepore and Matthew Stone offer a multifaceted critique of the Gricean picture of language use, proposing in its place a novel framework for understanding the role of convention in linguistic communication. They criticize Lewis’s and Grice’s commitment to what they call ‘prospective intentionalism,’ according to which utterance meaning is determined by the conversational effects intended by the speaker. Instead, they make a case for what they call ‘direct intentionalism’, according to which utterance meaning is determined by the speaker’s intentions to use it under a certain grammatical analysis. I argue that there is an equivocation behind their critique, both regarding the type of meaning that is at issue and the question each theory is attempting to answer; once we prise these issues apart, we find that Lepore and Stone’s main contentions are compatible with the broadly Lewisian/Gricean picture.