Varieties of intentional objects

Abstract

This paper proposes a classification of entities that are introduced in various theories of intentionality under the label “intentional objects.” Franz Brentano's immanent objects, Alexius Meinong's entities “beyond being and non-being” and Roman Ingarden's purely intentional objects can serve as examples of such entities. They all have in common that they have been introduced in order to extensionalize so-called “intentional contexts.” Not all such objects, however, deserve the name of intentional objects. In particular, neither Frege's senses nor mental contents of the early Husserl are to be classified as intentional objects in my sense. Roughly speaking, to be called “an intentional object,” a postulated entity must be supposed to function as a target of the subject's intention: intentional objects are supposed to stand “before the subject's mind” so that they “replace” the common sense objects of reference. The intentional objects that were introduced in the history of philosophy make up groups that, ontologically, are very heterogeneous. It is, however, possible to formulate certain systematic criteria for classifying them.