Varieties of Contemporary Christian Virtue Ethics

Abstract

Contemporary Christian virtue ethics, like contemporary philosophical virtue ethics, is generally seen as having emerged in the latter part of the 20th century out of a sense of dissatisfaction with the reigning Kantian and utilitarian options in moral thought. A host of critiques were mounted: of the abstract and formal character of moral theory, of a preoccupation with moral quandaries, of an inattention to the emotions and moral psychology more generally, of an overemphasis on the individual, and of a preoccupation with right action at the expense of reflection on broader questions of the good, excellence, or flourishing (Anscombe 1958; MacIntyre 1981; Pincoffs 1986; Williams 1985; cf. Baron 2011). Theologians seized upon the opening created by rumblings of dissatisfaction with modern moral theory to argue that aspects of Christian ethics that had come to be seen as liabilities could now be claimed as distinctive strengths: its tradition-bound character, emphasis on formation of character through core narratives and moral exemplars, and its teleological orientation (Hauerwas 1985; Meilaender 1988; Murphy et al. 1997). The work of G.E.M. Anscombe and Alasdair MacIntyre was particularly important for stimulating new theological attention to the Thomistic-Aristotelian tradition of virtue ethics.