Abstract
This paper analyzes the similarities and differences in the structure and dynamics of party–state systems and their different metamorphosis from a comparative perspective. This approach allows interpretation of the Chinese system specifics and its transformation within this framework. Theoretical findings are based on empirical research carried out in Hungary, Romania, and China by the author between 1975 and 2014. Empirical research revealed a politically monopolized interactive and intertwined network of dependency and interest promotion among actors in the party, the state, and the economy during decision-making. This network possesses similar elements and connecting and operating principles whatever the time, the space, and the level of its aggregation. It renders the structural background of power distribution and that of the politically rational behavior of economic actors in the selective distribution of resources and in the overall drive for growth, resulting in frequent investment overheating and overcapacity. The comparative framework also defines the structural varieties of power distribution in the network that are responsible for the differences in the operation and the sequence, speed, and conditions of system transformation.
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