Variation of principal-agent relations in Russian federal autocracy

Abstract

ABSTRACT After twenty years of Putin’s rule, Russia has become a full-fledged autocracy, with regional governors subordinate to the federal center, serving as agents of the president-principal. The country thus provides vivid empirical evidence for agency relations between the national leader and regional elites in a multi-level autocracy. This study focuses on the relationship between the federal center and regions after the 2012 revival of the direct gubernatorial election in Russia. It argues that within the general political contract, different principal-agent relationships coexist between the Kremlin and regional governors. Combining the problems of information asymmetry and goal conflict, discussed in the principal-agent theory, this article formulates theoretical expectations for four agency relations, with three of them having empirical evidence in Russia. It also shows that for each type of agency relations the president-principal develops a toolkit to handle the agents, which is based on repression, co-optation, and legitimation.