Variance, norms and cooperative behavior in public goods games.

Abstract

This study examines the relationship between the variance of others' contributions, social norms (empirical and normative expectations), and cooperative behavior using a classic linear public goods game. The following results are observed. First, the variance of a participant's group members' contributions had a negative impact on their contributions, empirical expectations, and normative expectations. Second, deviations from the mean, whether negative or positive, were deemed less socially appropriate. Third, while there was a strong relationship between variance, social norms, and cooperative behavior, the mediating effect of social norms was found to be insignificant. Finally, there were some notable findings regarding behavior type. Although free riders and cooperators exhibited distinct behavioral patterns, their normative expectations were similar. Free riders expected others to cooperate, but their empirical expectations were significantly lower than cooperators' expectations, which were aligned with their actual contributions. These findings contribute to research on the relationship between distribution heterogeneity, social norms and cooperative behavior. Furthermore, these findings provide valuable insights into management practices.