Values, Sovereignty, and World Law

Abstract

PRESENT thinking about world law and international order seems concentrated on the stumbling block of national sovereignty. The frustration resulting from what appears to be an insurmountable obstacle to a coveted end has produced some rather weird semantic legerdemain. There seems to be an increasing chorus of international wellwishers who assure us that nationalism is a myth, without real or factual foundation; it is, so they tell us, merely a of or attitude, and anyone knows that, with a proper exercise of reason and a sufficient application of will-power, attitudes can be changed. We must, it is argued, change our from one of nationalism to one of internationalism. The notion that nationalism refers to nothing more real or factual than a state of mind is one of the most dangerous delusions evident in our present thinking about world affairs. One can describe almost anything, I suppose, in terms of one's attitude toward that thing; and it is, of course, a useful catharsis for the individual to understand, if he can, the nature of his attitudes and states of mind. To assume, however, that in describing a of one has exhausted the meaning of a thing or has even formulated anything significant about the object is to court delusion bordering on insanity. Sticks and stones will indeed break our bones if we ignore their real and substantial nature under the illusion that we can alter hard, material existence by assuming a proper or of mind. Nationalism represents something more fundamental than an from which individuals can be converted by the preachment of moral precepts or even by the application of reason. Men are often nationalistic against their will and against the judgment of their reason; not all men who have expressed-and do now express-loyalty to a or have been fools or moral illiterates. Let us assume, then, in fairness, that nationalism can be the of a reasonable man toward an object which he considers to be real and substantial. Certainly, this will in large measure determine his action in respect to matters affecting the which is the object of his attitude. It should be remarked that this may be positive or negative; antinationalism, as directed toward a disliked state, can surely be as strong a motivating force as nationalism. It is becoming increasingly popular to argue that individuals are wrong in assuming the real or objective existence of the and are hence deluded in adopting an of nationalism toward this unreal or state. Let us examine this assumption very carefully, for surely we do not want to betray, by invective or inducement, the lot of men into the hopeful belief that one of their bitterest problems is merely an error of observation. If their are really no sticks and stones in nationalism, then let us not be daunted by names. On the other hand, if the sticks and stones of nations are really there, it would be not only foolish but downright hazardous for us to ask men to ride gaily up to these barricades under the illusion that a right will dispose of these hard and brutal facts like wind dispelling a fog. If the term nation represents something that is real, factual, and substantial, then it will not do to dispose of nationalism as a wrong or unnecessary of or attitude. When real things become objects of action for men, men assume an toward those things. If the things are real, such an is a necessary component of the motivation to action. The prob-