Abstract
This article investigates three ideas that have had a hegemonic position during the formative period of the majoritarian model of democracy: (1) Value Relativism of Axel Hagerstrom, (2) Tingsten’s procedural concept of democracy, and (3) Jorgen Westerstahl’s popular-will theory of democracy. These three ideas are often believed to give support to a kind of moral subjectivism that is hostile to constitutionalism. An abstract conceptual analysis is combined with a more historical approach focused on the impact of these ideas through different normative interpretations. The conclusion is that neither Value Relativism (and the associated Scandinavian legal realism), nor the procedural concept of democracy has any anti-constitutional implications. The popular-will theory of democracy, on the other hand, has a stronger theoretical link to anti-constitutional ideas.
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