Abstract
The idea of this research starts from the debate about the efficiency of the Italian capital market. In an increasingly globalized context, where Italian companies have to compete not only among themselves but also with foreign forces, the inefficiency of the capital market could be a fundamental discriminant. This paper aims to analyze the contestability in the Italian market. As it is known, it has some peculiarities. If compared with the other market, the Italian one is strongly characterized by the presence of small and medium-sized enterprises (SME), most of them family-run. In the Italian listed companies the entrepreneur and the manager are the same person, often chosen in the same family that exercises control. So the Italian market has a low contestability. Furthermore, the analysis conducted allows determining the existence of a relationship between value creation and contestability.
Highlights
The analysis of Italian listed companies conducted in this work cannot ignore the typical Italian business environment and the main characteristics of the reference stock market
Contestability is a recently discussed topic; most of the contributions taken into consideration are linked to what is a theme closely connected with the contestability that is the theme of the separation between ownership and control
From the analysis the small size of the stock market characterized by a small number of listed companies emerges first of all
Summary
The analysis of Italian listed companies conducted in this work cannot ignore the typical Italian business environment and the main characteristics of the reference stock market. On the other side the non-delegation of management to external managers is a brake, by not resorting to administration specialists and relying solely on family members, there is the risk of losing a valuable tool for the financial supply which is the quotation. This requires a managerial culture often absent in SMEs. The private benefits of control play a fundamental and interesting role. Private benefits of control refer to the amount of benefits that the controlling shareholders extract from the companies that they drive This topic is very current and fundamental for the study of financial market development and protection for minority shareholders. The second method, by Lease, McConnell, Mikkelson, De Angelo, Rydqvist, focuses on
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