Value as Interest--A Criticism

Abstract

JN A recent book, General Theory of Value, R. B. Perry has given us what is widely recognized to be one of the most important works in the field of ethics and valuation that America has produced. He has carefully worked out a theory of which has never before been given a thorough exposition. It is consequently worth while to examine this new conception of the nature of and to test its validity. We cannot attempt here to criticize the book as a whole; the inference should not be drawn, because we find only things to blame, that we think there is nothing in the book to praise; quite the contrary. Perry has set forth many interesting and well-put psychological analyses of and its integrations, as well as many other keen insights for which we can only thank him. Limitations of space make it necessary to confine our discussion to a few criticisms of his fundamental thesis. His thesis is that value in the generic sense attaches itself to all objects of all interest.' By interest is meant the state, act, attitude, or disposition of favor or disfavors conception which is otherwise expressed by the terms desire, will, purpose, and the like.' In considering this theory of value, we must keep clearly in mind Dr. Perry's meaning that is constituted by or desire itself,5 and not by its satisfaction or fulfilment. The view that is constituted by satisfaction of