Valois Military Administration on the Norman Frontier, 1445-1461: A Study in Medieval Reform

Abstract

BY 1445, A CENTURY OF WAR had proven catastrophic for all that it touched in France.I Each apparent revival of Valois fortunes degenerated into a new status quo that increased the horrors of war by creating a surplus of mercenary soldiers without any legitimate use for their talents. Left to their own resources, these troops imposed throughout France a reign of terror which the Valois monarchy was, for decades, unable to end. Finally, Charles VII seized the opportunity provided in 1445 by a truce with the English to cashier many of his nominal defenders and to assemble the rest into a limited number of compagnies d'ordonnance. These companies were to be paid regularly, assigned to specific garrisons, and commanded by captains commissioned by the king. This process, completed with surprising ease, has since been regarded as an undisputed success. The campaigns from 1448 to 1451, which restored most of France to Valois control, vindicated the initial reforms. After 1451 the new military force proved responsive to royal authority to a degree unprecedented in medieval Europe. Charles found the companies useful not merely against the English, but against domestic enemies as well: in the reconquest of Guienne, in the campaign against the Armagnacs, and the seizure of Dauphine. By 1461 the value of this new standing army to the continued success and growth of the Valois state was manifest. This study concerns the process of creation of the Valois army. The implementation of military reforms after 1445 aptly illustrated the nature of the Valois state. Charles, acting on precedents dating back to the reign of his grandfather, sought only to reduce military violence by guaranteeing mercenary troops regular pay. Reform succeeded because it was traditional in conception, realistic in ambition, and simple in application. The administrative challenges of organizing professional military forces were met on an ad hoc basis. A structure of command and control was only gradually developed. Evolutionary in theory, the reforms proved revolutionary in practice. The standing army proved incompatible with the traditional medieval order, but its creation resolved a genuine constitutional crisis posed when a monarchy with legitimate authority but little power was confronted by military companies with force alone to authorize their de facto rule. Uniting the companies with the monarchy overcame this separtion of legitimacy and power and foreshadowed the evolution of the modern state. The compagnies d'ordonnance,