Abstract
National identifications, cues from political actors, and cost-benefit calculations have been pointed as the main determinants of secession preferences. However, a recent surge in independence support in Scotland suggests that abrupt political changes may also affect these preferences: Brexit and the differentiated management of the Covid-19 pandemic by the UK and the Scottish governments are named as causes of the first independence sustained majority registered by polling in Scotland. In this article, I discuss how voting shocks may affect the levels of support for independence, revise the evidence that sustains these claims, and analyse how they have changed the profile of the pro-independence voter. The effect of these questions has substantial implications for a possible second independence referendum in Scotland, as well as for the broader debate on the sources of secession support.
Highlights
National identifications, cues from political parties and leaders, and cost‐benefit calculations have been pointed as the main determinants of individual preferences about secession
I assess the determinants of secession support paying special attention to major political events such as the Brexit rupture and the crisis triggered by the Covid‐19 pandemic, events with the potential to prompt sections of the population to update their views on seces‐ sion
Brexit can reinforce the idea of a democratic deficit due to the difference in preferences between Scotland and the rest of the UK evidenced by the outcome of the 2016 EU membership referendum, whereas the different handling of the pandemic by the Scottish and UK gov‐ ernment may help build support for a valence secession, that is, an independence backing grounded in the view that Scotland would govern itself more effectively as an independent country
Summary
Cues from political parties and leaders, and cost‐benefit calculations have been pointed as the main determinants of individual preferences about secession. Brexit can reinforce the idea of a democratic deficit due to the difference in preferences between Scotland and the rest of the UK evidenced by the outcome of the 2016 EU membership referendum, whereas the different handling of the pandemic by the Scottish and UK gov‐ ernment may help build support for a valence secession, that is, an independence backing grounded in the view that Scotland would govern itself more effectively as an independent country. Apart from these narratives with a potential direct effect on secession preferences, both shocks can moderate the effect of secession deter‐ minants on secession support. I discuss the findings’ implications for the Scottish case and the broader debate on the individual determinants of secession preferences
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