Uzbekistan and the United States: Friends Or Foes?

Abstract

n July 7, 2005, Uzbekistan’sMinistry of Foreign Affairsaccused the United States offailing to honor its financialobligations towards Uzbekistan. This was atransparent excuse. The United States hadno financial obligations towardsUzbekistan. The Uzbek communique wasthe precursor to a formal eviction notice.Tashkent gave U.S. forces 180 days toleave the Karshi-Khanabad Air Base. Thisbrought an end to a strategic partnershipthat was forged in the aftermath of Sep-tember 11, 2001. Tashkent’s move sur-prised many observers at the time, but withthe benefit of hindsight it is reasonable toargue that the writing had already been onthe wall for months. This paper examinesthe dynamics of U.S.-Uzbek relations andthe single most important factor that brokethe alliance.A critical factor in policy making inpost-Soviet Central Asia is the confluenceof “national interests” with “regime inter-ests.” This is, of course, not unique; as ageneral rule, authoritarian regimes exhibit apronounced tendency to project their owninterests onto the nation. “National inter-ests,” in effect, become a euphemism forwhat is in the best interest of the rulingregime. This confusion is exaggerated inCentral Asia. For example, inTurkmenistan, the late president namedcities after himself or his mother and evenrenamed the months of the year after hismother. This is an extreme case. But otherleaders are not far behind. In Uzbekistan,the ruling regime has systematicallypresented President Islam Karimov as thesavior of the nation, a reincarnation of thefourteenth century hero and champion ofUzbek traditions, Amir Timur. In thisparadigm, President Karimov and hisgovernment have an exclusive monopolyon defining what is in the best interests ofthe nation. Regime continuity, therefore, isseen by those in power as synonymouswith national security.This confluence has played itself out inUzbekistan’s foreign policy. Since indepen-dence in 1991, Uzbekistan has maintaineda difficult relationship with Russia and theUnited States, marked by an apparentinconsistency. In the early days of indepen-dence, the Uzbek leadership pursued athinly disguised hostile policy towardsRussia and openly courted the UnitedStates. Following the September 11 attacksand the U.S. involvement in Central Asiaand Afghanistan, Tashkent moved speedily