Abstract
This paper deals with the question of presumptions relevant in criminal law, including the so-called substantive law presumption of guilt. Any normative connotations of this presumption are definitively excluded. The considerations are based on one of the theoretical concepts of factual presumptions (preasumptiones hominis), the so-called mixed concept, whereby presumptions are perceived as evidentiary simplifications, a particular form of non-deductive inferences which neither restrict the principle of free appraisal of evidence nor shift the burden of proof against the law. A critical analysis is made of selected doctrinal conceptions, especially those that favour distinguishing presumptions that are relevant in criminal law. Attention is also devoted to the notion of findings of fact, especially in the context of their relation to the category of legal assessments of criminal agencies during the trial. A hypothesis is formulated that findings of fact can relate to assertions about facts referring to objective reality, as well as about conventional facts in law, for which facts the constitutive rules determine the elements of the structure of an offence viewed from the dogmatic perspective.
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