Utilizing Near-Ultrasound Inaudible Trojan (NUIT) to compromise microphone security

Abstract

Voice Control Systems (VCSs) provide a user-friendly interface for issuing voice commands to smart devices. However, the security of VCSs remains a challenge, as evident from two distinct attack classes: (i) inaudible attacks, feasible when the attacker is in proximity to the victim, and (ii) audible attacks, which can be executed remotely by embedding attack signals into audio. In talk introduces a novel class of attacks known as Near-Ultrasound Inaudible Trojan (NUIT). NUIT attacks combine the advantages of both classes, being both inaudible and capable of remote execution. Additionally, NUIT attacks can achieve end-to-end unnoticeability, a crucial aspect often overlooked in the literature. Notably, NUIT attacks leverage victim speakers to compromise victim microphones and associated VCSs, eliminating the need for specialized speakers. The feasibility of NUIT attacks is demonstrated, and an effective defense against them is proposed.