Utility Tempered with Equality

Abstract

Controversies about utilitarianism and egalitarianism have taught us that neither utility maximization nor equality is the sole goal of morality for distributions of benefits. Rather both are goals, and typically they conflict. Progress on distributive morality now requires, as John Hospers ([5]: 426) observes, a method of working out compromises between utility and equality. Such a method of compromise would not determine the morally best distribution. Determining the morally best distribution would require a resolution of conflicts between all the goals of distributive morality. Andthere are goals of distributive morality in addition to utility and equality. For example, there are goals calling for the protection of rights and the recognition of merit.' These goals often conflict with utility and equality, and they will often conflict with compromises between utility and equality. A method of solving distribution problems will have to work out those conflicts as well. However, a method of compromise for utility and equality would make important progress toward solving distribution problems. Given the many conflicting goals of distributive morality, determining the morally best distribution is similar to determining the direction of a body on which many forces are exerted.