Abstract
This paper focuses on the rational distribution of task utilities in coalition skill games, which is a restricted form of coalition game, where each service agent has a set of skills and each task agent needs a set of skills in order to be completed. These two types of agents are assumed to be self-interested. Given the task selection strategy of service agents, the utility distribution strategies of task agents play an important role in improving their individual revenues and system total revenue. The problem that needs to be resolved is how to design the task selection strategies of the service agents and the utility distribution strategies of the task agents to make the self-interested decisions improve the system whole performance. However, to the best of our knowledge, this problem has been the topic of very few studies and has not been properly addressed. To address this problem, a task allocation algorithm for self-interested agents in a coalition skill game is proposed, it distributes the utilities of tasks to the needed skills according to the powers of the service agents that possess the corresponding skills. The final simulation results verify the effectiveness of the algorithm.
Highlights
The coalition skill game is a typical model of task allocation problem for self-interested agents, the studies on which may help provide new thoughts for solving other cooperation problems of self-interested agents
The whole frame of TAAUDA is shown in Algorithm 1, where DRS denotes the maximum number of times the order of service agent selecting task is changed, DN denotes the maximum number of times the task selection state is disturbed, and IN denotes the maximum number of times the task agent adjusts the utility distribution scheme
In simulation 1–4, of the 4 groups of data sets, the runtime and average system revenue of TAAUDA were compared with the results of the other 5 algorithms
Summary
The coalition skill game is a typical model of task allocation problem for self-interested agents, the studies on which may help provide new thoughts for solving other cooperation problems of self-interested agents. The following question for coalition skill games is considered: Given the task selection strategies of self-interested service agents, how do the task agents distribute their utilities to selection strategies of self-interested service agents, how do the task agents distribute their utilities to the service agents so that it can get all the skills they needed? For the task allocation problem the self-interested service agents are not willing to cooperate to complete t2. For the task of the self-interested agent coalition skill game, the utility distribution strategies of task agents affect allocation problem of the self-interested agent coalition skill game, the utility distribution strategies the individual revenues and the system total revenue to a certain extent. 4 describes theSection basic thoughts of TAAUDA, andworks analyzes the task allocation for self-interested agent coalition skill game.
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