Utilitarianism without Moral Aggregation

Johan E Gustafsson

doi:10.1017/can.2021.20

Abstract

AbstractIs an outcome where many people are saved and one person dies better than an outcome where the one is saved and the many die? According to the standard utilitarian justification, the former is better because it has a greater sum total of well-being. This justification involves a controversial form of moral aggregation, because it is based on a comparison between aggregates of different people’s well-being. Still, an alternative justification—the Argument for Best Outcomes—does not involve moral aggregation. I extend the Argument for Best Outcomes to show that any utilitarian evaluation can be justified without moral aggregation.

Highlights

Is an outcome where many people are saved and one person dies better than an outcome where the one is saved and the many die? Most of us judge that the former is better. What justifies this evaluation? The standard utilitarian answer is that it would be better if the many were saved, because the combined gain in well-being for the many if they were saved would be greater than the gain in well-being for the one if he or she were saved
The justification by the Total Principle is an example of moral aggregation, which some people, such as John M
I will extend the Argument for Best Outcomes with a further principle to show that any utilitarian evaluation can be justified without relying on the Total Principle or any other form of moral aggregation

Summary

Introduction

Is an outcome where many people are saved and one person dies better than an outcome where the one is saved and the many die? Most of us judge that the former is better. I will extend the Argument for Best Outcomes with a further principle to show that any utilitarian evaluation can be justified without relying on the Total Principle or any other form of moral aggregation.

Results

Conclusion