Utilitarianism and risk

Abstract

In day-to-day life, we are continuously exposed to different kinds of risk. Unfortunately, avoiding risk can often come at societal or individual costs. Hence, an important task within risk management is deciding how much it can be justified to expose members of society to risk x in order to avoid societal and individual costs y – and vice versa. We can refer to this as the task of setting an acceptable risk threshold. Judging whether a risk threshold is justified requires normative reasoning about what levels of risk exposure that are permissible. One such prominent normative theory is utilitarianism. According to utilitarians, the preferred risk threshold is the one that yields more utility for the most people compared to alternative risk thresholds. In this paper, I investigate whether and the extent to which utilitarian theory can be used to normatively ground a particular risk threshold in this way. In particular, I argue that there are (at least) seven different utilitarian approaches to setting an acceptable risk threshold. I discuss each of these approaches in turn and argue that neither can satisfactorily ground an acceptable risk threshold.