Abstract
Abstract : U.S.-Sino relations in the twentieth century have been driven by a constant battle between the ideological and pragmatic components of the American psyche a crisis of conscience. The motivation behind U.S. policy has swung from pure profit, to regional balance of power, to rampant paranoia and the red scare, and back towards regional stability, all within the span of 95 years. The multi polar world we now occupy by no means eased this internal struggle nor altered the rationale set out 50 years ago for productive U.S.-Sino relations the maintenance of a regional balance of power. The recent victory of democracy over communism in Eastern Europe served to stoke the fires of idealism thus making the U.S. ideological struggle more complex. Today, for the first time in several decades, no major strategic fault lines split the major powers in the region. Now, perhaps more than ever, it is critical for the United States to be mindful of its true strategic interests in Asia and carefully choose the right tools to accomplish its international objectives. By analyzing three major U.S.-Sino policy interactions in the twentieth century--the loss of China in 1949, the Nixon rapprochement in 1972, and the 1989 Tiananmen Square trade backlash this paper explores the premise that those U.S. foreign policy decisions affecting China which were based on an idealistic view of the world, rather than realism, were unsuccessful. Through an historical analysis of these events, this paper concludes that a realistic approach to China as we move towards the twenty-first century will ultimately prove the most successful in furthering U.S. strategic interests in Asia.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have