Using technology to prevent fraud in high stakes national school examinations: Evidence from Indonesia

Abstract

Cheating reduces the signaling value of examinations. It also shifts the focus of teachers and students away from learning. Combating widespread cheating is difficult as students, teachers, and bureaucrats all benefit from high reported grades. We evaluate the impact of computer-based testing (CBT), an at-scale policy implemented by the Indonesian government to reduce widespread cheating in the national examinations. Exploiting the phased roll-out of the program from 2015 to 2019, we find that test scores declined dramatically, by 0.5 standard deviations, after the introduction of CBT. Schools with response patterns that indicated cheating prior to CBT adoption experienced a steeper decline. The effect is similar between schools with and without access to a computer lab, indicating that the reduction in the opportunity to cheat is the main reason for the test score decline. In districts with high adoption of CBT, schools that still used paper-based exams cheated less and scored lower, indicating spillovers of CBT. The results highlight the potential role of technology in improving the effectiveness in efforts to overcome collusive behavior in the education sector.