Abstract

Abstract : It is well documented that the Defense Acquisition System has habitually fallen short of providing timely, cost-cognizant procurements in support of America's warfighter requirements. Hence, this MBA study employed a systems approach to more credibly pinpoint improvement areas in the Defense Acquisition System through the use of systems theory and an organizational systems model as foundational analytical tools. The results of this study identified system incongruencies with success factors, system direction, learning, input variability, and task differentiation, which are likely sources of common, ill-conceived outcomes of the Defense Acquisition System. This analysis, through its recommendations, also laid groundwork for future, solution-oriented studies of how to suitably design Defense Acquisition System processes and structure strategies in support of warfighter needs.

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