Abstract
In the paper, we present an application of the MACBETH approach to a certain model of coalition formation. We apply the MACBETH technique to quantify the attractiveness and repulsiveness of possible governments to parties. We use this method to calculate the utilities of governments to parties. Based on these utilities, stable governments are determined. In the paper, an adequate example is presented.
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