Using grid-group theory to explain distinctive Japanese political institutions

Abstract

Particularly for Americans, Japanese political institutions present a paradox. On one hand, in comparison to other advanced industrial societies the size of Japan's public sector (as a proportion of GDP) is extremely small. On the other hand, Japan's small but expert state is highly interventionary, leaving far less to the vagaries of markets than the United States or even the more statist societies of Europe (Johnson 1982). This contrast leaves many American analysts, particularly economists but others (Esping-Andersen 1997) as well, in a quandary as to whether Japan is a liberal individualistic society. I draw on Douglas-Wildavsky “grid-group” theory to explain these seemingly contradictory institutional characteristics as the result, not of liberal individualistic influence, but of conflict between and the alternation in dominance of two factions of Japanese hierarchy. My primary focus of attention rests on showing how these two hierarchical factions produce a public policy orientation with a predisposition toward state social intervention but periodic restraint with respect to public social programs that accounts for the modest fiscal size of the active Japanese state. I also examine Japanese public policy responses to recent difficulties in overcoming recession and confronting increasing immigration to clinch the case that Japan is a society in which various factions of hierarchy, rather than liberal individualism, dominate.